The Retreat - The Battle for Crete

• The Battle for Crete
• Overview
• The Battle: Day 1-3
• The Battle: Day 4-6
• The Retreat
• The Evacuation
• The Army Says Thankyou
• The Capitulation
• The Aftermath
• The Controversies
• Related Book
• Further Reading
• About This Feature
• Image and Media Gallery
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Day seven, 26 May 1941: the decision to withdraw

On 26 May the Germans continued their advance eastwards across the island. The British forces withdrew to a line east of Galatas and, as the day wore on, were subjected to ongoing attacks from the air and ground. It had become clear to General Freyberg that the loss of Crete was only a matter of time: the decision was made to withdraw to Sfakia in preparation for evacuation.

German plan of attack

General Ringel's orders to his troops were that they were to continue the attack, moving slowly and carefully eastwards, and to continue the outflanking manoeuvre to the south by way of the village of Alikianou, which was to be dive-bombed during the morning.

Galatas area

The New Zealanders had withdrawn to their new line during the night. This was east of Galatas towards Canea and formed a line from the coast to the villages of Perivolia and Mournies.

The morning began quietly because of the cautious German advance, but eventually they came up against 21 Battalion, who were between the village of Evthymi and the coast. The 21st's position was quite vulnerable: there was no cover and the ground was stony, making it difficult to dig in even had there been the tools to do so. By about 1 pm, after some manoeuvring, the situation became stable again in this area.

Further inland 19 and 28 Battalions came under machine gun and mortar fire, as well as bombing and strafing from the air, but no major attack eventuated during the morning because the German plan was to wait until late afternoon when the sun would be behind them and support from Stukas would be available. Even then, the attack did not come in full force, but was trying enough and troops had to be moved around to reinforce the line. This was very dangerous because of the German planes. One private recalled:

'...we were making our way up a small gully....A Hun fighting Messerschmitt crossed this gully firing his guns. I felt the heat of the bullets pass my face and the leaves were dashed from the tree under which I was crouched. "Damn it all," I thought, "this is no place for mother's little boy now that bloody squarehead knows we are here." So I was out of the gully, crossed the road and made my way up among the olive trees to our rendezvous, and it's just as well I did for that darn plane came down the gully a few minutes later (not across it as it did the first time) and cleaned up fifteen men.'

D. M. Davin, Crete, pp 334-5

The Australians around Pirgos and Mournies had a very torrid day as the Germans unsuccessfully tried their outflanking manoeuvre.

The artillery, now reduced to eight guns, had a frustrating day not least because of the attentions of German aircraft, but also due to a lack of ammunition, food and sleep. These trials were not peculiar to the artillery, of course—the infantry were no better off. Even though they had managed to hold the line that day, none could be expected to stand up to the weight of men and weapons that the Germans were now able to use against them.

Hard decisions had to be made.

The Decision to Withdraw

By this time General Freyberg had concluded that the loss of Crete was only a matter of time—the troops were no longer capable of offensive action. They had reached the limits of their endurance and were too ill-equipped and immobile to stand up against any more of the concentrated bombing that they had been experiencing. Casualties were heavy and most of the guns had been lost. If withdrawal and evacuation was decided upon then it would be possible to get a certain proportion, though not all, of the troops off the island. But he would try and hang out if it was thought essential. This was the gist of Freyberg's message to General Wavell at Middle East Headquarters that morning.

As the afternoon wore on, Brigadier Puttick, at Divisional Headquarters, came under pressure from Brigadier Inglis and the Australian, Vasey, to withdraw. But he did not have the authority to give such an order, for General Freyberg had placed General Weston in charge and Weston would not order it without first consulting with Freyberg. Difficulties with communications again caused confusion, and Weston's subsequent orders to hold on were not sent to Puttick until 1:10 am the next morning.

Meanwhile, Puttick, in a situation which was clearly worsening—his own headquarters was coming under German fire—urged by the two brigadiers and unable to contact Weston, decided that there was nothing for it but to withdraw. Orders were sent to both brigades telling them to fall back to 42nd Street, a line running through the villages of Khristos and Tsikalaria to Ay Marina—so-called because 42 Field Company (Royal Engineers) had been working there before the invasion. The move was to take place at 11:30 pm.

It duly happened, Brigadier Hargest describing the atmosphere:

'All arrangements had been made and at about 10:30 we moved each [battalion] on its route with the Australians on our flanks to the south. The going was terribly hard, the roads had been torn up, vehicles burned across them, huge holes everywhere—walking was a nightmare. Our guide lost us with [the] result that we went through Canea itself, transformed from a pleasant little town to a smouldering dust heap with fires burning but otherwise dead.'

Davin, Crete, p. 353

Creforce Headquarters

General Wavell's reply to General Freyberg's morning message asked him to try and hold on and block the Germans' eastwards progress. It did not arrive until late that night, after Freyberg had sent Wavell an update of the situation as he now saw it:

'the front to the west of Canea had been penetrated and men were falling back in disorder; he was trying to form a line which would cover Suda Bay until the supplies and men due that night were disembarked; but any stabilisation could only be temporary, and he would have to aim at getting some supplies dumped at Stilos with the ultimate plan of falling back on Sfakia and Porto Loutro.'

Davin, Crete, p. 365

That night Freyberg visited General Weston's headquarters at 42nd Street. As a result the order for withdrawal was prepared. Its most important provisions were that all troops were to withdraw to Sfakia with Layforce (a newly-arrived British commando unit under General Laycock) acting as rearguard. This withdrawal would begin the next night, 27 May.

Day eight, 27 May 1941: the withdrawal to Sfakia begins

27 May was a day of much confusion and chaos as poor communications hindered the withdrawal of the main force to Stilos and then on to Sfakia on the south coast. Retimo continued to be cut off from supplies and evacuation routes. British troops at Heraklion were also cut-off and a naval evacuation from the town was planned.

Canea and 42nd Street

The New Zealanders' positions had been taken over by Force Reserve—a group of British units which had been sent out from Suda Bay. They came under heavy attack that day and attempted to fall back—many units succeeded in getting back to Suda Bay but some did not, either because they did not receive their orders or because they were, for one reason or another, unable to do so.

On arrival at Suda Bay they were told to head for Sfakia.

That evening Canea was taken by German paratroops.

At 42nd Street the 19 Australian Brigade manned the line to the right; 5 Brigade took the left. There seems to have been some confusion among the battalion commanders as to whether they were in a rest area with a covering force in front or whether they were manning a defensive line. After a bit of to-ing and fro-ing they were put into a defensive line and agreed amongst themselves that if the Germans got close, they would open fire and charge.

The men in both brigades were exhausted—they had been fighting or on the move constantly, were hungry and thirsty and in great need of sleep—so after having dug themselves in, eaten such hard rations as they had, they were preparing to rest. 19 Battalion's Lieutenant Cockerill describes the scene:

'In this area the first thought of each man was to have a wash which we hadn't managed to have for some seven or eight days and to drink gallons of water which had also been very short. We redistributed the available ammunition and managed to get some washing done as, by this time, our clothes were literally sticking to us. There was very little aircraft action here and the majority of chaps, always prepared to dive for cover, wandered round seeing who was still on deck and who wasn't as most of the chaps hadn't seen each other since the action started at Darratsos. Yarns were being swapped, washing was being done and bodies were being washed when, without any warning whatsoever, the enemy opened up with spandau fire from about three hundred yards.'

D. M. Davin, Crete, Wellington, 1953, p. 376

It was a great surprise. The plan to charge, however, was at once put into action—bayonets fixed, the troops charged, the Australians first but soon the men from the 28 (Maori) Battalion were in the lead. By the time they had run 200 or so yards, they saw Germans starting to panic, throwing down their arms and running. From an interview with Peter Wildey:

'You said you were at 42nd Street. You arrived just after the bayonet charge?

They'd just gone through. I met Tim Ferguson, the OC of the 7th Field Company, he told me that right near the end there was a whole group of Germans milling about down a wee bank. There was a big Maori there, he had a look and got his tommy gun and prrr, killed the lot, like that. He said they just slithered over each other like whitebait. So that's war for you. Getting really vicious.'

Peter Wildey, interviewed by Megan Hutching, 9 Nov 2000

The charge had the desired effect. Shocked by the high casualties among his troops the German commander withdrew those that survived and headed instead for Suda Bay.

Neither Brigadiers Vasey nor Inglis were sure what was expected of them once they had reached 42nd Street. Vasey recalled that they had not received orders to withdraw to Sfakia although they knew that that was the plan. During the day they arranged for two battalions of Layforce to cover their withdrawal, and then made plans to leave for Sfakia that night. 19 Brigade, the Australians, were to leave first, followed by 5 Brigade. As evening drew near, however, German activity in the area intensified, which made the withdrawal difficult.

Moving the wounded men also posed a problem: there were too few trucks, so units were told to do the best that they could. 21 Battalion still had a truck, which was used for their wounded; 23 Battalion discovered some abandoned trucks, which they were able to repair and use to evacuate their casualties as well as some from 28 Battalion and some Australians. The seriously wounded had to be left behind.

The Australians were a little late beginning their withdrawal, but eventually, some time after midnight, all the units of both brigades had passed through A Battalion of Layforce, who were covering their withdrawal. Captain J.P. Snadden described his feelings at the time:

'Tired as we were we burned up the pavement of the excellent motor road which led round Suda Bay. Soon however we broke off on to a much rougher going and started climbing. Throughout there was silence broken only by the tramp of feet. Our greatest hardship was the lack of water and the fact that we could not smoke. Over the rise and down into a huge valley, the road getting worse all the time. At the bottom we see lights. These turn out to be the burning stumps of olive trees which glow hotly in the breeze which fans them. What can have been the tragedy here? We strike a bridge just before we begin climbing again. A plane is heard overhead—"Keep still". A yellow flare lights up the whole countryside and we are a huddled column on the roadway. How long does it take to burn out? It seems an age but it shows one thing—a well. The flare out, in we go "Boots and all". To hell with planes. Up more hills and really we think we must be climbing the main ridge. Somewhere about 0300 hrs 28 May we doss down on a stony ridge overlooking the road and sleep the sleep of the just.'

Davin, Crete, p. 382

4 Brigade

The situation for the brigade was rather chaotic but eventually most of the units turned up south-east of Suda. The brigade, along with the Composite Battalion and 5 NZ Field Park Company, were told to head for Sfakia, via Stilos, which they did. Along with them were many men who had become separated from their units, which resulted in some confusion at Stilos. This was not helped by strafing and bombing by the Luftwaffe, which went on all day and into the evening—so late, in fact, that many of the men remarked that the pilots must be hoping for overtime.

Retimo

The garrison's luck was not improving. An attempt by the RAF to drop supplies was unsuccessful because the pilots could not locate the airfield in the dark, and communications by land were non-existent. General Freyberg attempted to organise their evacuation but events conspired against him and the orders did not get through.

Heraklion

Heraklion, too, was in dire straits—the Germans were in a situation where they could cut the roads to the west and south of the town and commanded the high ground to the south-east. It was clear that it would not be long before they attacked the town.

During the day, however, the British commander at Heraklion received orders for evacuation on the night of 28/29 May: warships would arrive at about midnight and take the men off.

Creforce

It was another trying day for General Freyberg. He had had to plan for an evacuation without having received orders to do so from General Wavell at Middle East HQ. In fact, he waited most of the day for the orders to arrive. Finally, late in the afternoon the message arrived. (It was then that Freyberg attempted to make the arrangements for the garrison at Retimo.)

The plan for evacuation at Sfakia on the south coast of the island provided for 1000 men to be taken off on the night of 28 May, 6000 on the night of 29 May, 5000 on the night of 30 May and 3000 on the night of 31 May. For the Navy this meant a reorientation from preventing an invasion of Crete to finding the ships to transport or escort troops across the hazardous seas between Crete and Alexandria.

Day nine, 28 May 1941: over the White Mountains to Sfakia

28 May saw the withdrawal of the main British forces to Sfakia. The combination of sporadic attacks and the journey over the White Mountains made the withdrawal both dangerous and arduous, though a breakdown in German communications ensured the evacuation route was kept open. Retimo continued to be cut off, while most of the troops at Heraklion had already been evacuated by ship. At Sfakia preparations were made for the evacuation of the first 1000 troops from the main force.

German orders

The German advance the previous day had been considerable: Canea was in their hands and Suda soon would be. The pursuit was now on and General Ringel was determined to relieve Retimo and Heraklion as quickly as possible. This was the gist of his orders for 28 May.

German military intelligence in Crete during the battle was bad: if Ringel had known that General Freyberg's main force was already moving south towards Sfakia, he could easily have sent sufficient troops to cut of the retreating men. The success of the British evacuation owes much to Ringel's faulty intelligence service.

Creforce rearguard

This consisted of A and B Companies of 28 (Maori) Battalion, under Captain Rangi Royal, and a party from Layforce, the British commando unit, based at the small village of Beritiana. They soon found themselves under attack from the west and south, and Royal realised that they would have to fall back. This they did, travelling across country by an arduous route that took them, eventually, to Armenoi and then Vrises, on the road to Sfakia. Casualties, despite the fighting on the way, were remarkably low: one killed and six wounded, with all of the latter being brought out safely.

5 Brigade

5 Brigade had bedded down at Stilos after their withdrawal from 42nd Street. Two of the officers from 23 Battalion were reconnoitring on the west side of the village when they saw a party of Germans about 400 yards away. The men, many of whom had already fallen asleep, were called on to repel the attack — one, Sergeant Clive Hulme was

'sitting side saddle on the stone wall shooting at the [Germans] down on the lower slopes. His example did much to maintain the morale of men whose resources of nervous and physical energy were already exhausted.'

23 Battalion history, quoted in D. M. Davin, Crete, Wellington, 1953, p. 396

For this, and his part in the earlier counter-attack at Galatas, Hulme was awarded a VC.

Eventually, with the help of 19 Battalion, the attack was beaten off.

Brigadier Hargest had then to decide what to do. He called a conference of his commanding officers at about 9 am at which the options were presented: stay and possibly have to fight and march again that night, or march in daylight at the mercy of the Luftwaffe. It was agreed, despite Lt-Colonel Dittmer's objection to leaving his rearguard companies behind (as he thought would be required), to march out that day. Hargest hoped that they would get as far as Vrises that day and hide up there before the heat of the afternoon sun set in. The withdrawal went well and soon the column was on the march with the troops in single file on each side of the road. Hargest thought his men were 'magnificent.' (Davin, Crete, p. 400)

Covering their withdrawal was Layforce's D Battalion and the Australian 2/8 Battalion. They were attacked by II Battalion of 85 Mountain Regiment and other German troops. This heavy fighting continued all afternoon. Having received orders to pull out, the defenders began to fall back at about 9:15 pm.

The White Mountains

These were a formidable obstacle at the best of times, but for troops who had been fighting for nine days they were an almost insurmountable one. From Stilos to the Askifou Plain, the next main stopping place, is about fifteen miles (24 km) by road, but it is uphill all the way—from 300ft above sea level at Stilos to 3000ft at the crown of the pass to the plain beyond. This was, as Davin writes, 'a cruel culmination to a battle which had ended in defeat; and not to be able to cross it was to become a prisoner.' (Davin, Crete, p. 402)

The road was littered with empty water bottles, steel helmets, trucks and, occasionally, dead bodies. It was a terrible march, so awful that many of the men have little memory of it—they were, as one put it, 'senseless to all feeling.' (Davin, Crete, p. 405) The men of 4 Brigade and Composite Battalion had set off on the night of 27 May; the men of 5 Brigade headed off the next night. Few of them, fortunately, had any idea of the distance between them and the sea at Sfakia.

Eventually they made the pass. 23 Battalion took up a defensive position there and the rest went on through the night to the Askifou Plain.

Retimo and Heraklion Areas

Retimo was still cut off and unable to receive messages regarding evacuation. Things went according to plan at Heraklion, however, and by 3 am all except the wounded and a detachment guarding a road block had been evacuated.

Creforce Headquarters

Creforce Headquarters issued the formal evacuation order: 5 and 19 Brigades would move through 4 Brigade's positions on the Askifou Plain down to the beach at Sfakia. Fighting troops would embark first, with wounded and those who had fought the longest having priority. Only organised groups travelling from the assembly area by a specified route would be embarked; parties given a specific task one night would have priority of embarkation the following night.

On the beach itself preparations were being made for the embarkation of the first 1000 men. The four destroyers Napier, Nizam, Kelvin and Kandahar arrived at about 10 pm, bringing a much-needed supply of rations. All walking wounded—about 300 altogether—got into position for evacuation, and all except about 70 got on board together with 800 men from the Suda Area. The destroyers sailed for Alexandria at about 3 am.

Next page: The Evacuation