The Evacuation - The Battle for Crete

• The Battle for Crete
• Overview
• The Battle: Day 1-3
• The Battle: Day 4-6
• The Retreat
• The Evacuation
• The Army Says Thankyou
• The Capitulation
• The Aftermath
• The Controversies
• Related Book
• Further Reading
• About This Feature
• Image and Media Gallery
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Day ten, 29 May 1941: down to the beaches at Sfakia to await evacuation

As the remnants of the main British forces retreated across the Askifou Plain the first evacuation ships left Sfakia carrying 6000 troops. The Germans finally entered Retimo leaving the Australian defenders stranded. The ships that had evacuated Heraklion suffered heavy losses from German air attacks.

Askifou Plain

23 Battalion was guarding the road at the entrance to the Askifou Plain, with the two Australian battalions in support, so there was no immediate danger that the Germans would rush the plain.

For the first time since the withdrawal began, the various commanders were able to meet and plan the evacuation. It was decided that 4 Brigade would concentrate at the southern exit of the plain and then, at nightfall, retire to the beaches. 5 Brigade would move further towards Sfakia to an area near the village of Komitadhes, followed by 19 Australian Brigade and a Royal Marine battalion, and then progress towards the beaches. It was assumed that the evacuation would be completed on the night of 30 May.

During the day, German troops began to attack 23 Battalion, but the New Zealanders managed to withdraw to the 5 Brigade dispersal area near Komitadhes. They were pleased to leave—the gorge was rocky and hot, rations were few and water short—although the 5 Brigade area was not much better—rocky, with little shelter. Their withdrawal was closely followed by German troops.

Meanwhile, during the day, Major Bull had managed to organise the men who had been in the Composite Battalion, along with gunners from the artillery, into a group of around 3000 who sheltered in a ravine near Komitadhes. Various dressing stations and first aid posts processed the 500-odd wounded during the day and the majority of these men were moved towards the place where they would wait to go down to the ships. It was hard going for them over such difficult terrain and in the heat.

Retimo and Heraklion

By the evening, German troops had entered the town. Rations for the Australian defenders were due to run out the next day. They had no communication with Creforce, although they did manage to get hold of Alexandria during the day.

The convoy of ships which evacuated the Heraklion garrison came under strong German air attack on the way back to Alexandria and suffered heavy casualties among the troops.

Sfakia

On the night of 29/30 May Glengyle, Phoebe, Perth, Calcutta, Coventry, Jervis, Janus and Hasty evacuated 6000 men to Alexandria.

Day eleven, 30 May 1941: who should be evacuated and who would get left behind?

On 30 May a German attack on the rear-guard was snuffed out by the work of Charles Upham's platoon. Evacuation plans had to be scaled down as some of the ships were forced back to Alexandria and tensions rose as decisions had to be made as to who should go first. In the end 1500 troops were successfully evacuated that night.

German position

The previous day had been a good one for General Ringel and his troops—the advance guard reached Retimo and, in the Sfakia sector, 100 Mountain Regiment followed up the New Zealand withdrawal during the night to occupy the Askifou Plain on 30 May.

During the day 100 Mountain Regiment clashed with the British rearguard, which consisted of Australian Bren carriers and three tanks supported by 42 Field Company of Royal Engineers, as the rearguard moved southwards towards Sfakia. By dusk the Germans were a mile south of the village of Imvros, where the Australian 2/7 Battalion barred the road. Realising that to get through he would need to outflank the Australians Colonel Utz, 100 Mountain Regiment's commander, sent troops down two ravines which flanked the road.

In the western Sfakiano ravine Charles Upham performed the deeds that, along with his earlier actions, earned him the first of his Victoria Crosses. Four companies of 20 Battalion were on their way down to the beach to bring back rations when Germans started firing from behind them. The two rear companies returned fire and A and C Companies were sent up the cliffs of the ravine so that they could block it. As Kippenberger recalled it:

'Upham's platoon was slowly climbing up the step 600-foot hill west of the ravine. The men were weak and very weary but they kept slowly going, and we could see that Upham was working round above the Germans still in the bottom of the ravine and pinned down by fire from the eastern bank. Two hours after they had started the climb there was another sharp outburst of firing. It lasted about a minute, there were then some single shots, and then silence. A little later Upham's platoon started to come back and then a message came that all twenty-two of the enemy party had been killed, completely helpless under his plunging fire.'

From Howard Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier, quoted in Davin, Crete, pp 430–1

There was little other German activity that day.

Creforce HQ

Meanwhile, General Freyberg and his commanders were discussing that night's evacuation. Each of the four destroyers due to arrive could take off 500 men. Both 4 and 5 Brigades were to go, but one of 5 Brigade's battalions would have to stay behind as there was not enough room on the ships for them all. Brigadier Hargest reluctantly nominated 21 Battalion to stay, as its troops were the freshest and its commanding officer, Colonel John Allen, was the youngest of his battalion commanders. It was not a decision that Hargest enjoyed making.

18 Battalion was to provide a guard for the beach to make sure that the evacuation took place in an organised manner.

After this decision was made, the grim news arrived from Alexandria that only 250 men could be taken on each ship. Hargest was relieved for it meant that all of 5 Brigade (except for some of 28 (Maori) Battalion) would be staying another night and he would not have to leave only some of his men behind.

During the day more bad news arrived—two of the four destroyers had had to turn back to Alexandria. Brigadier Inglis was determined, however, that the two which were coming would take off the 1000 men who had been told that they were going that night.

At 6 pm those who were to embark set off. After dark they went down to the beach in parties of 50, were checked through the cordon, and eventually went aboard.

Colonel Kippenberger described the events and feelings of those going:

'The afternoon wore miserably on, but at last there was nothing for it but to say good-bye and go. I spoke as reassuringly as I could to the rear-party and went off very sadly.

We had a tramp of some miles to the beach, the last part lined with men who had lost their units and were hoping for a place with us. Some begged and implored, most simply watched stonily, so that we felt bitterly ashamed. There was a cordon around the beach with orders to shoot any man who tried to break in. I had to count my men through. We were the last unit to pass'.

From Infantry Brigadier, quoted in Davin, Crete, p. 435

About 1500 were taken off that night.

Day twelve, 31 May 1941: the last night of the evacuation

On 31 May the majority of the remaining British force were evacuated from Sfakia. Lack of space on ships combined with a scarcity of supplies meant many troops — including most of the 2180 New Zealand POWs taken on Crete — were forced to wait behind for inevitable capitulation to the Germans. See 'Capitulation' for further detail.

German activity

Colonel Utz decided to continue with the outflanking manoeuvres. He learnt from a regimental observation post that there were still strong forces at Komitadhes and Sfakia and decided to postpone an attack until he had artillery and air support. Because the artillery would not be able to get there until the afternoon on 1 June, the attack was postponed until 2 June.

General Weston began the day under the mistaken impression that there were to be two more nights of evacuation. In discussion with the Australian Brigadier Vasey, who was commanding the rearguard, the two agreed that Vasey and his troops would stay in their present position and then hope to be evacuated on the night of 1 June.

5 Brigade

The units were told that they should start coming down from the escarpments above Sfakia beach at dawn. It was not a pleasant journey, Brigadier Hargest noting that they went past 'burned trucks, piles of documents, dead men—all the litter of an escaping army was there—everything but food'. (Davin, Crete, p. 443)

It was a hard day for Hargest as he had to deal with constant requests for a place in the evacuation from unattached troops in the vicinity. He was moved by their plight, and tried to get as many of those who had obviously been involved in the fighting on board a ship.

Detachments from the various battalions of 5 Brigade were sent out to defend the area around the embarkation area.

By late afternoon General Weston had finally learned that this night was to be the last of the evacuation. When he called a conference and broke the news, those present were stunned, but then set about increasing the quotas for each unit so as to get more men off.

Weston then met Brigadier Vasey and told him that he was allotting 500 extra places to the Australians. The news for Vasey was not overwhelmingly bad—it meant that he would be able to get most of his battalions off that night instead of having to try and hold a weakened line for a further day.

Weston then had to organise the capitulation. Lt-Col Colvin, commander of Layforce's A Battalion, was given the task of handling it. To him was given General Weston's order:

'The position must be considered in the light of the following facts: 1) There are no more rations available and men have had no food for three days. 2) The wireless set can only last a few hours and the risk of waiting for further instructions from H.Q. M.E. [Middle East Headquarters] cannot be accepted. 3) The decision to give priority in withdrawal to fighting troops has reduced numbers below the minimum necessary for resistance. 4) No more evacuation is possible. 5) You will collect as many senior officers as possible and make known to them the contents of this order. 6) You are ordered to make contact with the enemy and arrange capitulation.'

Davin, Crete, p. 446–7

22 Battalion and what was left of 28 (Maori) Battalion were given the task of acting as beach cordon. Units authorised to embark were 5 Brigade Headquarters, 21, 22, 23, 28 and 20 Battalions in that order—and no one else. The prospect for the men who were not with these units was bleak. By the end of the day Weston knew that the latter would be taken prisoner.

Those embarking that night had mixed feelings: relief at getting off the island was mixed with deep regret for those who had to be left behind.

Although the evacuation of the 5 Brigade troops went smoothly, the Australian units had more trouble. They began moving to the beach on time but got caught up on the narrow track with waiting men and officers. The result was that 2/7 Battalion was not able to get to the beach in time and almost all were left behind.

For those who got on board ship, it was an uneventful voyage back to Alexandria.

Battle for Crete: evacuation schedule

Allowing for men killed on passage and for probable miscounting on disembarkation, it is likely that around 17,000 troops were evacuated between 22 May and 1 June 1941. The nursing sisters who had been on Crete were evacuated at the end of April well before the battle started.

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