The Battle: Day 4-6 - The Battle for Crete

a group of soldiers eating and shaving outdoors

Living quarters under the olive trees on Crete

Queue at an open-air mess

Disabled Roy Farran tank in Galatas

A German soldier enters Galatas

Day four, 23 May 1941: consolidating the line

On 23 May the British forces retreated from Maleme to the new line at Platanias, apart from some of the wounded who had to be left behind for inevitable capture by the Germans. The troops stationed at Canea-Galatas had a relatively quiet day as did those at Retimo and Heraklion, though the cutting off of Retimo from road supply routes was a serious concern.

The withdrawal begins

Orders for the withdrawal reached Brigadier Hargest at around 1 am. By about 5 am all the battalion commanders, except Colonel Dittmer of the 28th, had reached 23 Battalion headquarters for a conference where they were given their orders to withdraw. The news came as a surprise to them.

The withdrawal began but not everybody was able to move back. The medical officer of 23 Battalion, Captain R. S. Stewart, had some 60 stretcher cases in his care—men from 20, 22, 23 and 28 Battalions. He decided to stay with these men and was joined by the battalion chaplain, Capt Rev R.J. Griffiths, and three orderlies. To Stewart and Griffiths fell the task of explaining to the wounded that capture was inevitable.

By 2 pm the last of the rearguard-men from 28 (Maori) Battalion-were behind the new line.

During the morning there had been fighting in the 28 Battalion area around Platanias bridge—over the river, about a mile west of the village. Australian artillery worked hard this day and may well have been the reason that Germans coming from the west made no full-scale assault on the front that day. There were forays by them during the day, however, and it became apparent that they were preparing an outflanking attack from the south as well as a frontal attack.

It was clear that 5 Brigade was still in a dangerous position—too far forward to be proof against a strong attack. Further withdrawal was inevitable.

Late that afternoon the brigade received its orders to withdraw—it was to go into reserve east of Karatsos. The withdrawal took place that night (23/24 May) and was successful—even 5 Field Ambulance managing, despite difficulties obtaining trucks and ambulances to move the wounded, to get all 135 patients out. Lieutenant Thomas, then commanding C Company, 23 Battalion, described the withdrawal:

We withdrew under orders soon after midnight, carrying our wounded on improvised stretchers down the steep cliff face and then along a difficult clay creek bed to the road. Then we marched until nearly dawn. I was very impressed by the continued discipline of the men. Mile after mile we trudged. Everyone was tired. All were vaguely resentful, although none of us could put a finger on the reason. Those who could bear the strain better carried the rifles and bren guns of those who were fatigued. Len Diamond, a rough and lovable West Coast miner with a difficult stammer, raised a smile whenever things seemed a bit much.

D. M. Davin, Crete, Wellington, 1953, p. 263

Canea-Galatas

For 10 Brigade, 23 May was a relatively quiet day. There was some fighting in the village of Stalos as the Germans coming out from the Prison Valley area attempted to cut the coast road. Activity by the New Zealand defenders was such that this plan was abandoned.

Along with some other readjustments, plans were made to have 18 Battalion relieve the Composite Battalion. The former's commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Gray, was able to have a look at his battalion's new position during the day and was disturbed by the length of the front they would have to defend. He seems to have decided to leave Ruin Hill out of the line. It was likely that the meeting of the two German forces—Group West and Group Centre—was going to take place within a matter of hours. This would 'enable [them] to launch a far more formidable infantry assault on the Galatas line than anything experienced so far, [so] the consequences of leaving a vital feature unmanned were bound to be serious.' (Davin, Crete, p. 268)

The Australian battalions, 2/7 and 2/8, and 2 Greek Regiment were also re-deployed in order to offer more protection around the Prison-Canea road and the Turkish fort area.

Retimo and Heraklion

There was some fighting around Retimo, but the Germans made little progress. In Heraklion the situation was similar. Freyberg was seriously concerned about the situation at Retimo, however, as it was completely cut off by road from the rest of the defending forces and no stores or medical supplies could get through

Supplies

Supply was one of Freyberg's most pressing concerns. He had nearly half a million mouths to feed and great difficulty getting transport to move stores. There were 150 15-hundredweight trucks, 117 carrier vehicles of miscellaneous other kinds and seven ambulances to serve the whole British force—New Zealand, Australian and United Kingdom. And this scanty number was constantly dwindling through constant air attack during the day and the lack of repair facilities.

The problem was further exacerbated by the state of the roads, and the fact that some had German troops on or alongside them.

At this stage in the battle, Suda Bay sector had rations for ten days; Retimo for eighteen days and Heraklion for fourteen days. This was two-thirds rations, not full rations. So supplies were urgently needed, as were picks, shovels and wire for preparing defensive positions. Freyberg concluded that British command in the Middle East must somehow contrive a means of supplying the island by small but frequent deliveries—and Suda Bay still seemed the best option as the port of arrival, given the lack of development of the small ports on the less vulnerable south coast.

Day five, 24 May 1941: the Germans press on towards the village of Galatas

On 24 May the British forces were bracing themselves for a German onslaught on Galatas while the Suda area and Retimo and Heraklion sectors suffered ferocious air attacks. While the German forces could now replenish supplies and land men with ease, the British forces and their provisions were rapidly being depleted. The British forces now seemed to have only two options: be defeated in the field or withdraw.

German plan of attack

On the German side, General Julius Ringel, who had now taken command of Groups West and Centre ordered his troops to secure the positions they had already reached, then to push forward level with Platanias on the left flank (going in an easterly direction), and in the centre and on the right to move towards the Canea-Alikianou road and the Galatas heights in order to meet up with the 3 Parachute Regiment of what had been Group Centre.

Action now centred around the village of Galatas.

5 Brigade spent the day re-organising.

4 Brigade was in a defensive position surrounding Galatas with slender artillery support. As Davin writes:

'Morning on the brigade front was one of great tension and feverish preparation for what was expected to be a formidable onslaught and one that would come soon. Air attacks were frequent, mortaring and machine-gun fire increased throughout the day, and there was a good deal of movement to be seen in both the Prison area and that of the coast road.'

D. M. Davin, Crete, p. 285

No attack eventuated, however, although there were some skirmishes as German reconnaissance patrols probed the 4 Brigade line. As a result of these attacks Colonel Gray realised the implications of his failure to have men on Red Hill so he reassigned some troops to try and minimise the effect.

Puttick's perspective

How NZ Divisional commander, Brigadier Puttick would have seen the situation on 24 May:

Although the day had been got through without a major attack, the situation could not have seemed cheerful. The [Germans were] now at liberty to land as many men and supplies from [their] relatively unlimited resources in Greece as [they] had aircraft to carry; and [German] troops already on the ground west of Canea were free to join forces and to concentrate against a single front in what might prove overwhelming force. Puttick, on the other hand, was running short of ammunition—the 72 three-inch mortar bombs which were all he had left were distributed that day—and only small-arms ammunition was reasonably plentiful; he had lost two and a half troops of guns in the withdrawal; he was bedevilled by bad communications—to his rear the [German] bombing constantly cut the lines and kept the signals units busy with mend and makeshift answers to recurring emergencies, and the bridge on the coast road out of Canea had been made impassable to heavy traffic. But worst of all was the fact that his fighting units were being steadily depleted by the casualties of each day's fighting and there was no way of making good his losses. The total of killed, wounded, and missing was already 20 per cent of the divisional strength and a much higher percentage of the strength of each fighting battalion.

Davin, Crete, p. 28

Suda area and the Retimo and Heraklion sectors

In the Suda area command, ground fighting was now over. Air attacks, on the other hand, became more ferocious and Canea was reduced to burning ruins.

The day brought no major changes in the Retimo sector. Heraklion was bombed in the early morning and intermittently throughout the day, and more paratroops were dropped at about 8 am. They were not able to obtain their objective of closing in on the airfield, however.

All General Freyberg's reports to Middle East HQ on this day stress the ferocity of the German air attack on the front line, and on Canea and its environs. He also assessed the casualties of the defence in all sectors—1909, three-quarters of which had been inflicted on the New Zealand Division. Total enemy losses he calculated at 3340, of which more than 1000 were dead.

Some help came from the air that day—five Hurricanes operating from North Africa attacked German positions at Heraklion, and that night an attack was made on Maleme by eight Wellingtons. But these operations were too small-scale to affect the German control of the air or to interfere seriously with German plans.

Freyberg's perspective

Freyberg's private view of the situation on 24 May:

At this stage I was quite clear in my own mind that the troops would not be able to last much longer against a continuation of the air attacks which they had had during the previous five days. The enemy bombing was accurate and it was only a question of time before our now shaken troops must be driven out of positions they occupied. The danger was quite clear. We were gradually being driven back on our Base areas, the loss of which would deprive us of our food and ammunition. If this heavy air attack continued it would not be long before we were driven right off our meagre food and ammunition resources. I really knew at this time that there were two alternatives, defeat in the field and capture or withdrawal. Without tools, artillery and transport we could not readjust our rearward defences.

General Freyberg's Report, p. 40, quoted in Davin, Crete, p. 294

Canea-Galatas

The Australian battalions, 2/7 and 2/8, and 2 Greek Regiment were also re-deployed in order to offer more protection around the Prison-Canea road and the Turkish fort area.

Retimo and Heraklion

Day six, 25 May 1941: a black day at Galatas

After a massive attack the village of Galatas was captured by the Germans. A determined counter-attack by New Zealand troops saw them retake the village that night, though this reoccupation was to be short-lived. In the Canea area British troops had to be withdrawn in order to maintain a now foreshortened front line. The combination of events made it clear that a steady retreat was now the only option.

German plan of attack

General Ringel had issued orders the previous evening for a two-pronged attack in which I and III Battalions of 85 Mountain Regiment would take Alikianou and the area east of it, then push on to Suda Bay and aim to cut the road between Canea and Retimo.

The main thrust of the attack, however, would be carried out by 100 Mountain Regiment and the paratroops. The former would capture Galatas and the high ground to the south of the village; the latter would attack on the front north of Galatas.

Air support was arranged as well—heavy attacks on Alikianou and Galatas at 8 a.m. and again on Galatas at 12:45 and 1:15 p.m.

4 Brigade, Galatas

Those defending the Galatas line expected a determined attack from the Germans and awaited it with some uneasiness—an uneasiness which was not unfounded as on the main front the opposition was large and relatively fresh. They also had to contend with 'all the air attack the sky could find room for', in Davin's vivid phrase (D. M. Davin, Crete, Wellington, 1953, p. 297).

Against this, the New Zealand Division had only one reasonably fresh battalion (18), which was down to a strength of about 400 men (as opposed to around 750). The rest of the line was manned by non-infantry formations 'and, although the men in these units were of excellent human material, they were untrained as infantry and had already been in the line since the battle began six days before.' (Davin, Crete, p. 298)

But the morning passed and the expected attack did not come. The New Zealanders did, however, have to endure continued severe fire from machine guns, mortars, artillery and aircraft. As the day went on this fire moved towards a peak which coincided with the first attacks by the German infantry. By about 2 o'clock all the forward companies of 18 Battalion and the Divisional Petrol Company were under attack near Wheat Hill. There was also fierce fighting in the northern section of 18 Battalion's D Company area. In this intense combat the New Zealanders' situation became increasingly desperate as the afternoon wore on. Platoons and companies held on as long as they could before falling back.

Brigadier Inglis was asked for reinforcements, which he swiftly sent.

By 7:30 pm 23 Battalion had been ordered forward to take over in the area formerly held by 20 Battalion. (21 Battalion came forward into the positions 23 Battalion had occupied.) While he was waiting for 23rd to arrive, Inglis considered the situation: the line held by 18 and Composite Battalions was temporarily gone; his reserve was already in use except for about a company of 20 Battalion and such reinforcing parties as could be scraped together from his own Brigade Headquarters. He set about getting these latter organised and sent off an officer, a group of signallers, the Brigade band, 20 Battalion's pioneer platoon and the Kiwi Concert Party into an improvised line north of Galatas. Some of 20 Battalion's companies were also moved to straighten the line, and once 23 Battalion's A Company arrived and was put into the line there was once more a continuous front from Galatas to the sea.

German pressure then eased in this area, but continued further south against 18 Battalion and the Petrol Company. Pink Hill was the important spot here and plans were made to stop the Germans getting hold of it.

The Petrol Company held on to the west of Pink Hill and received some reinforcements during the afternoon. Initially they did not hear of 18 Battalion's withdrawal but did get the news eventually. By that time they were under very heavy fire so there was no time to lose in trying to get them out. This was achieved—with a skill, Davin says, 'very creditable to troops untrained in infantry tactics' (Davin, Crete, p. 307)—and they withdrew to Galatas.

Unfortunately there were no troops west of Galatas for them to link up with, so they kept withdrawing. Shortly after this the Divisional Cavalry also moved back towards Karatsos and 19 Battalion.

In the meantime men from 19 Battalion, who had been fighting elsewhere on Pink Hill, were also able to withdraw after having suffered heavy casualties: of 23 men in 7 Platoon of A Company, only 12 came off.

These men's defence of Pink Hill was important in this day's fighting:

'there seems little doubt that the remainder of the brigade owed much to the stubborn bravery with which they had defended the key feature entrusted to them. For by now the defence had had a chance to reorganise, it was approaching dark and the [German] effort for the day was almost spent.'

Davin, Crete, p. 308

Counter-attack on Galatas

Colonel Kippenberger saw the need to re-take Galatas because the position was so critical—the Germans were in the village and thus the New Zealanders' left flank was in danger. He realised that it was possible for the Germans to renew their attack before nightfall and therefore deny 18 Battalion the opportunity to reorganise, which they badly needed. And if the Germans did attack, and were able to break through in the centre, they could head for the coast road and cut off the defenders' newly-restored right flank.

So when two tanks, under Lieutenant Farran, appeared at around 8 o'clock that night, it seemed like the perfect opportunity for a counter-attack. Kippenberger described events in his autobiography, Infantry Brigadier:

'Farran stopped and spoke to me and I told him to go into the village and see what was there. He clattered off [in the tanks] and we could hear him firing briskly, when two more companies of the Twenty-third arrived, C and D... each about eighty strong. They halted on the road near me. The men looked tired, but fit to fight and resolute. It was no use trying to patch the line any more; obviously we must hit or everything would crumble away. I told the two company commanders they would have to retake Galatas with the help of the two tanks. No, there was no time for reconnaissance; they must move straight in up the road, one company either side in single file behind the tanks, and take everything with them. Stragglers and walking wounded were still streaming past. Some stopped to join in....The men fixed bayonets and waited grimly.'

Quoted in Davin,Crete, p. 311

After Farran returned from his reconnaissance, he needed a commander and gunner for his second tank—a number of volunteers came forward and Private C. D. Lewis, a machine-gunner attached to 23 Battalion became commander, with Private E. H. Ferry, a driver from 4 Brigade HQ, as the gunner.

While this was being organised Kippenberger sent word of the counter-attack to Colonel Gray of 18 Battalion and asked him to join in. With the few dozen survivors of the 18th, Gray waited on the eastern edge of the village. They were joined by a party from 20 Battalion's Headquarters Company. Gray told them that they were to clear the village with their bayonets—not, as Sgt H. W. Kimber reported later, 'a very bright prospect as the Jerries seemed to have [machine guns] and Mortars everywhere. There was a terrific amount of fire coming from the village.' (Davin, Crete, p. 312) Others from other units also joined in.

Meanwhile the two companies from 23 Battalion stood in two files on either side of the road, bayonets fixed. While moving up they had lost their commander, Colonel Leckie, who was wounded on the way, but the men were eager for the counter-attack.

The plan was simple—each company would attack on their side of the road behind Farran's two tanks.

It was not quite dark—just after 8 o'clock. The tanks set off, followed by the infantry—at first at a march, and then running. Almost at once, above the sound of small arms fire came a shout that Corporal H.M. Adams of 18 Battalion later described:

'It was quite dark now and suddenly from Galatas 400 yards away we heard the most ungodly row I have ever heard—our chaps charging and yelling and screaming to put the wind up them [Germans], cat-calls and battle cries, machine guns, rifles, hand grenades all going at once.'

Davin, Crete, p. 313, fn 4

The New Zealanders soon found themselves under fire from all sides. Eschewing stopping and clearing houses of Germans as they passed, they charged on and arrived at the main square. There they found the tanks—one was knocked out, the other also in difficulty. A fierce battle began in the square itself. Fire came from the other side of the square and they decided to charge. There was a lot of bayonet work and the Germans withdrew in disarray.

The charge continued after that initial success. Casualties were high, especially among the New Zealand officers. Fighting became confused. By this time Colonel Gray and the men of 18 Battalion had reached the square, and helped 23 Battalion to destroy a machine gun which was holding up the advance. A patrol was formed and went out beyond the square where the men encountered stiff opposition which was eventually dealt with. When the fighting at last died down, only one German strongpoint at the southwest exit of the village still held out.

The surviving officers now began to reorganise their troops for a possible German counter-attack, but this did not eventuate. Major Thomason had come up to replace Colonel Leckie as 23 Battalion's commander, and Colonel Kippenberger put him in charge of Galatas.

All the while the fighting was going on, villagers in Galatas sheltered in their houses.

And so ended what Davin describes as 'one of the fiercest engagements fought by any New Zealand troops during the whole war.' (Davin, Crete, p.316)

10 Brigade

After 25 May this brigade no longer existed. The Divisional Petrol Company and Divisional Cavalry were for the moment out of the picture, having joined 19 Battalion which properly belonged to 4 Brigade. And by this time all New Zealand units were so reduced in numbers that there was no need for more than two brigades

Divisional Headquarters

During the afternoon it became clear to Brigadier Puttick that the situation was worsening—there had been heavy air attacks on the forward troops, Canea and on all the roads around about. It might have been possible to hold out, for morale was still high, but so were casualties. There were too few men, inadequate artillery support, and no air support, and lack of relief meant that the defending troops were growing exhausted.

The success of the German attack in the afternoon made it obvious that if the Division was to keep an unbroken front, the line needed to be shortened. The only way to do this was to withdraw the forward units and make a line with the right flank of 19 Australian Brigade.

While Puttick thought that 5 Brigade should man the new line, he realised that the units of the two brigades were now very mixed and to disentangle them would not be easy. At 10 pm he received a request from Brigadier Inglis to go forward to 4 Brigade as soon as possible. Puttick was unable to go so sent Lieutenant-Colonel Gentry instead with instructions for the withdrawal of 4 Brigade.

4 Brigade Headquarters

Brigadier Inglis had called a conference of his commanders to discuss the possibility of a counter-attack, and it was this conference at which he had requested Puttick's presence. Inglis knew that he would have to use 28 (Maori) Battalion in any counter-attack, despite them not knowing the ground. In fact, prospects for a counter-attack were not good for a number of reasons, not least that the front was too wide for a single battalion in a night attack.

On the other hand, to decide against such an attack would be to take a decision vitally affecting the battle. It was for this reason that Inglis had wanted Puttick at the conference—it was just possible that the latter could produce some reinforcement that would make a counter-attack more feasible.

All the commanders knew that if the attack was not made, then Crete was lost; all knew how difficult it would be. That 28 Battalion was considered to be the last fresh battalion, despite their hard days' fighting, shows how pressed the others were. The 28th's commander, Colonel Dittmer, said it would be difficult but that he would give it a go.

At this point, Colonel Gentry arrived from Divisional HQ and was asked his views. He was against a counter-attack, explaining that if 28 Battalion was used that night a line could not be held the next day.

Inglis decided not to go ahead. Thus Galatas too must be relinquished for it could not be held—it was outflanked, it was an obvious target for concentrated bombing and the houses were too flimsy to offer much protection against such bombing. The villagers who were still present were also seen as a responsibility.

If Galatas was sacrificed, then the rest of the line would have to go as well, but there was no alternative but to follow Brigadier Puttick's plan. The commanders also agreed that it would have to be 5 Brigade which manned the line.

So Colonel Gentry returned to Divisional HQ, from where Puttick sent out orders regarding the new line and dispositions.

Creforce Headquarters

It was an anxious day for General Freyberg but not one that had given him any special grounds for anxiety until he received a report late that night from Brigadier Puttick regarding the events around Galatas. This must have made it clear to him that

'with the German penetration of the Galatas line and the enforced withdrawal to a new one, the character of the fighting had radically changed. There was now little or no hope of a counter-offensive which could retake the lost ground. From now on steady withdrawal was the best that could be hoped for.'

Davin, Crete, p. 327

The day did have one small redeeming feature, however, and that was the arrival of RAF Marylands, Blenheims and Hurricanes to attack Maleme airfield.

Next page: The Retreat