The Battle: Day 1-3 - The Battle for Crete

• The Battle for Crete
• Overview
• The Battle: Day 1-3
• The Battle: Day 4-6
• The Retreat
• The Evacuation
• The Army Says Thankyou
• The Capitulation
• The Aftermath
• The Controversies
• Related Book
• Further Reading
• About This Feature
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Day one, 20 May 1941: the Germans invade Crete

On 20 May the German attack began, focussing on the airfield at Maleme and the Canea area. The glider-borne troops and paratroopers were badly mauled where they landed in or near the defenders, and were rapidly eliminated. But in two areas the Germans got a foothold - west of the airfield at Maleme, where substantial forces had come down in undefended territory west of the Tavronitis river, and in what became known as Prison Valley in the Canea sector.

The German attack begins

The battle began at 6 am with an air bombardment by the German Luftwaffe. At 7:30am there was a lull in the attack, but after about twenty minutes a second, more intense phase of the bombardment began.

The German plan was that three groups would attack Crete: Group East would concentrate on Heraklion; Group Centre on Canea and its environs, and Retimo; Group West would attack Maleme. The attack would be in two waves: Maleme and Canea would be attacked in the morning, and Heraklion and Retimo in the afternoon.

Group West consisted of an Assault Regiment (an élite force especially trained for glider and parachute operations) and a company of the Parachute AA (Anti-aircraft) MG (Machine Gun) Battalion. Group West's goal was to seize the airfield at Maleme and keep it open for airborne landings; reconnoitre west as far as Kastelli; reconnoitre south and east and make contact with Group Centre.

As transport there were four groups of transport aircraft, and a half group of adapted bombers to tow the gliders. (A group consisted of four squadrons of twelve Junkers 52s each and additional aircraft for Headquarters personnel, supply and reconnaissance.)

The Germans appear to have assumed that the area to the east of the airfield would be as clear of defenders as the area to the west. This was a fatal mistake—23 Battalion and its auxiliary detachments were posted there.

At around 8:15 am paratroops began dropping to the west, south and east of the airfield. Glider troops had already landed, many of them doing so in the Tavronitis riverbed. Those paratroops who landed to the east and south of the airfield were heavily attacked—one battalion had two-thirds of its men killed along with its officers.

Maleme airfield

This vital position was defended by six mobile Bofors and four static Bofors anti-aircraft (AA) guns and two 3-inch AA guns. The guns' range was about 800 yards (500 metres) and to cover the area effectively they had to be sited close to the airport where complete concealment was impossible. The Germans had the sites plotted fairly accurately and had been bombing them fairly heavily in the days leading up to 20 May. The guns were also vulnerable to attack from the south and southwest by land.

The Germans needed to attack and take control of the airfield, which was overlooked by the dominating Point 107, and make the anti-aircraft guns inoperable.

22 Battalion was deployed around the airfield along with two companies of 27 (Machine Gun) Battalion.

In the morning of 20 May the main concentration of Germans landed to the west of the Tavronitis River. By early afternoon C and D Companies of 22 Battalion had lost contact with the Battalion headquarters. Headquarters Company had also lost contact.

Lieutenant-Colonel L.W. Andrew VC, 22 Battalion's commander, became more anxious as the afternoon wore on. He needed reinforcements and asked for them from 23 Battalion to his east, but Brigadier Hargest indicated that they were unavailable because 23 Battalion was already engaged in dealing with paratroops in its area (in fact they had their area well under control).

As a result, Andrew decided to use his meagre reserve—two I-tanks and 14 Platoon of C Company—in a counter-attack on the Tavronitis bridge area where German troops were in control.

The counter-attack was unsuccessful. C Company's commander, Captain Johnson, reported that he could probably hold on till dark but needed reinforcements. Andrew replied that he must 'hold on at all costs' but communication was then lost.

After hearing of the lack of success of his counter-attack, Andrew informed Brigadier J. Hargest, commander of 5 Brigade, that he must withdraw the Battalion. Hargest famously replied, 'Well, if you must, you must.'

This was at about 6 pm. But Hargest then advised Andrew that two companies (A Company, 23 Battalion and B Company, 28 (Maori) Battalion) were being sent up to reinforce him. Andrew seems to have thought that they would arrive quickly but they did not. B Coy, 28 Battalion got lost, and A Coy, 23 Battalion arrived between 9 and 10 pm.

As the situation at Maleme seemed so grim, Andrew made the decision to make a limited withdrawal to a nearby ridge at about 9 pm. But he soon decided to withdraw from this new position back to the 21 and 23 Battalion positions to his east. He decided that the ridge on which his Headquarters had been situated was too exposed to strafing and bombing.

At about midnight on 20 May 22 Battalion's withdrawal from Maleme was complete, except for C and D Companies (which later extricated themselves when they found the battalion had pulled back). 'Ultimately the withdrawal from Maleme was to entail the loss of Crete.' (Davin, Crete, p. 114)

23 Battalion, under Lt-Col D.F. Leckie, had been given orders before the battle began to go to the help of 22 Battalion if called upon. On the morning of 20 May the battalion was disposed along the road at right angles to the coast to the east of Maleme airfield and thus to the east of 22 Battalion. Soldiers saw gliders and paratroops arrive over Maleme in the morning; then it was their turn. Paratroops landed everywhere in 23 Battalion's positions. They spent the morning patrolling and in cleaning up operations. The battalion's observation posts reported that 22 Battalion seemed to holding alright at Maleme.

21 Battalion (commanding officer, Lt-Col J. M. Allen) was much under strength as a result of the casualties it had suffered in Greece. It was in a position to the south of 23 Battalion, and not many paratroops landed in its lines. Again, soldiers spent the day patrolling and mopping up stray Germans. Towards the evening the battalion experienced severe dive-bombing by the Luftwaffe.

Other units in 5 Brigade's area were:

28 (Maori) Battalion under Lt-Col George Dittmer. They were posted around the village of Platanias to cover the beach and the road. The battalion saw little early action although in the middle of the morning a glider and then a troop carrier crash-landed in D Company's area. At about 7 pm. B Company went off to help 22 Battalion at Maleme. Apart from this, the day was again spent mostly in mopping up and patrolling.

7 Field Company, NZ Engineers were stationed to the east of 23 Battalion. Around 100–150 parachutists landed on their west flank and were killed on the way down or mopped up.

19 Army Troops Company, NZ Engineers were stationed between 7 Field Coy and 28 Battalion. They only received a few paratroops.

Field Punishment Centre The men here were given rifles when the invasion began. The paratroops dropped in large numbers all through the Punishment Centre's area which was south of 7 Field Coy and about half a mile [900 metres] to the west of the village of Modhion. The men from the Centre mopped up all the paratroops and acquired some German weaponry as well. The rest of the day was spent dealing with snipers, evacuating prisoners and wounded, and collecting equipment from canisters dropped by the Germans.

Artillery—A, B and C Troops were stationed east of Maleme. They were able to get in some shooting and also came under fire; there were also some small-arms skirmishes with the paratroops.

At Kisamos Kastelli, around 20 kilometres west of Maleme, 1 Greek Regiment was stationed with their New Zealand instructors, under Major Bedding. The paratroops who landed here came from a detachment of II Battalion, the Assault Regiment. By 12 noon they had all been mopped up.

5 Brigade Headquarters Brigadier Hargest was at Platanias when the invasion began. He returned to his battle headquarters with some difficulty, and was able to observe Maleme airfield from there. There was confusion at Headquarters as to how things were going—communications between different units was very difficult—but by the early afternoon Hargest was confident that things would be alright. It is difficult to understand why Hargest did not order the 23 Battalion to go to 22 Battalion's support.

Canea-Galatas area

The German objective was to capture Canea and Suda. Two companies of an Assault Regiment, 3 Parachute Regiment and HQ 7 Air Division were sent into this area with strong forces of 8 Air Corps in support.

II Battalion, 3 Parachute Regiment, was dropped north of the area between the prison and Aghya. Their reception was heated. Karl Neuhoff, CSM in II Battalion wrote:

'The moment we left the planes we were met with extremely heavy small arms fire. From my aircraft we suffered particularly heavy casualties and only three men reached the ground unhurt. Those who had jumped first, nearer to Galatas, were practically all killed, either in the air or soon after landing. The survivors rallied to a position near the prison where we became organised, collected equipment, and formed up for an attack up the hill to the north near Galatas.'

Davin, Crete , p.142

The glider attack around Canea and Galatas was not successful.

4 Brigade This consisted of 18 Battalion, stationed near 7 General Hospital (British), 19 and 20 Battalions and 2 Greek Regiment.

On 19 May the 18 Battallion had escorted The King of Greece from a house near Suda Bay to a safer place in the Village of Perivolia.

[More information about the King of Greece and the Crete Campaign.]

2 Greek Regiment, under New Zealander, Major H. G. Wooller, fended off paratroops which landed in its area, despite a severe lack of ammunition. The Regiment got some support later in the day from 2/8 Australian Battalion which arrived from Georgeoupolis.

18 Battalion (other than B Coy), under Lt-Col Gray, was stationed on either side of the Canea-Maleme road near the coast and 7 General Hospital. They spent the day mopping up Germans. Gray described the process in a letter written in July 1941:

'I saw a parachute hanging in a tree and detected a movement around the left side of it. Fired quickly with my rifle—every officer in the battalion had a rifle. Then advancing very softly and quickly up to the parachute I looked round the side to see a Hun [German] lying on the ground beside a gaily coloured container fastened to a parachute. He moved, so I shot him at once to make sure, and then moved cautiously from cover to cover.

'I shot another hiding behind a tree, and wounded him. He was very frightened, but I told him to lie still and he would be looked after. Took his pistol away and gave it to Dick Phillips who was just on my right. No sooner had I handed it to him than he was shot through the knee. Two Huns about 30 yards away hiding behind a tree were shooting at the two of us. Two careful ones immediately despatched them both. There were plenty of bullets flying around but one had no time to bother about them. I saw George Andrews sitting on the ground taking careful aim at some cactus bushes behind us. "Steady on George," I said, "You will be shooting one of our own chaps." "No bloody fear, it's a Hun," he said, and fired, "Got him." '

Davin, Crete, p. 147

6 Field Ambulance and 7 General Hospital were subjected to a severe bombing and strafing attack which lasted around 90 minutes. Then paratroops landed and took over the hospital and the field ambulance.

After sitting around under German guard until midday, the prisoners were ordered to move towards Galatas and 19 Battalion. They were rescued by 19 Battalion's D Company after some fighting.

19 Battalion had around 200 paratroops land in their area. Most were killed. By 10 am all companies were reporting that all was clear. F Troop of 28 Battery, Royal Artillery was also stationed in this area and spent the day mopping up and firing at tempting targets when the opportunity arose.

1 Light Troop, Royal Artillery were stationed to the south of the Canea-Alikianou road. They were not very well-prepared but had support from a section of 19 Battalion's 8 Platoon from A Coy. Unfortunately they were over run by paratroops and had to withdraw with heavy losses.

At the end of the day, Brigadier Puttick felt that the situation was not too bad in 4 Brigade's area.

Galatas-Prison—Alikianou

The fighting that took place in this area over the first few days of the battle was second only in importance to that around Maleme airfield. This was 10 Brigade's area.

Colonel Howard Kippenberger, commanding officer of 10 Brigade, had decided to use Pink Hill as his battle headquarters, but the German invasion found him in Galatas itself:

'shaving in his billet while an enemy fighter flew up and down the main street. As he was contemplating, the shave finished, a more than usually watery porridge, four gliders passed overhead "in their silence inexpressibly menacing and frightening." He seized his rifle and binoculars and raced towards Battle HQ, the horizon full of falling parachutists.'

Davin, Crete, p. 153

Brian Bassett described the arrival of the Germans in the Galatas sector in a letter written in June 1941:

'There were hundreds of planes in the air-low-flying Dorniers swept us with a hail of lead, Stukas dive-bombed our FDL's [Forward Defended Localities], gliders slid over them where the mammoth troop-carriers nosed in and then right up to the ceiling of the sky whirled the ever-watchful Messerschmitts. The Condors swerved astride the Valley road and suddenly the sky was raining falling petals, tiers of planes simultaneously disgorging lines of black parachutes... Interspersed with these were white sheets dropping stores, yellow with medical supplies and green with mortars. '

Davin, Crete, p. 159

Units stationed in this area included:

8 Greek Regiment, stationed in the area around Alikianou, initially found themselves in some trouble as they were cut off from other units and threatened by the Germans. They fought well, however, and held on all day, inflicting severe casualties on the German troops in their area. The New Zealanders attached to the regiment were mostly captured.

6 Greek Regiment were stationed along the Prison-Galatas road and across the valley to the Turkish fort, with their Regimental Headquarters on Cemetery Hill. They too were ill-armed with little ammunition, and defeat was inevitable as they were attacked hard by German troops. They were eventually moved back to the 19 Battalion area by the New Zealand Engineers who were training them.

Another group of Greeks was also moved to Galatas and placed under the command of Captain Forrester, a British officer, by Captain Brian Bassett, Brigade Major of 10 Brigade.

Composite Battalion consisted of three main groups. The Reserve Mechanical Transport troops were between the coast and the northern slopes of Red Hill; two companies consisting of troops from the 4 Field Regiment, NZ Artillery and the Divisional Supply Company, were stationed on Red Hill and Ruin Hill and saw few landings of Germans in their lines. The third group was a mixed bag of 5 Field Regiment, NZ Artillery troops on Wheat Hill, who also saw few landings and spent most of the day patrolling their area, and men from the Divisional Petrol Company, who were stationed on Pink Hill. These men saw the main fighting on 20 May in the Galatas area.

The Divisional Petrol Company, the group on Pink Hill, was poorly armed and the soldiers, being mainly drivers and technicians, had little infantry experience. They came under heavy attack—all the officers were soon wounded and out of action along with most of the NCOs. Command was taken over by Captain Rowe from Brigade HQ who had been sent to help. The attack was beaten off but there was still a gap in the defence near the Petrol Company where the Greeks had fallen back.

A counter-attack using bayonets by the Greeks under Captain Forrester's command made the Germans withdraw, and a thin line of defence was then organised across the gap, including soldiers from 6 Greek Regiment rallied in the 19 Battalion area by Peter Wildey.

Pink Hill and this line were then attacked again. Later in the afternoon yet another attack forced some of the Petrol Company to withdraw to Wheat Hill.

'But a small party on Pink Hill itself held on stoutly and inflicted heavy casualties. Although the hill's head was bald and their positions were very vulnerable to constant mortaring from the prison area, this party stayed till dusk. By then so many were wounded and killed and links with the rest of the company so weak that CSM James, the local commander, decided to withdraw in the hope of reorganising and reoccupying the hill at dawn.'

Davin, Crete, p. 161

After their withdrawal, the Germans followed up and occupied the hill.

Divisional Cavalry, who were in quite an isolated position initially, were moved just before dusk to fill in the gap between Pink Hill and Cemetery Hill. Thus a dangerous weak spot was filled and the worst crisis of the day was over.

4 Brigade Headquarters, paratroops also landed around this position.

Counter-attack on the prison

There obviously needed to be a counter-attack on the prison, where the Germans had concentrated. A small operation using C Company of 18 Battalion was repulsed, so in the evening it was decided to use A and D Companies of 19 Battalion and three light tanks against the prison. There was some confusion regarding orders and what was happening, and the attack was eventually cancelled by Colonel Kippenberger. The companies had gone too far, however, and these orders could not be passed on, so the attack went ahead: both companies engaged the Germans and eventually met up about a kilometre north of the prison, but they could not make any significant progress.

Day two, 21 May 1941: the battle for Maleme airfield continues

On 21 May the Germans' planned naval attack was frustrated by the British Navy who were able to intercept their convoy before it was able to reach the land troops. The Germans continued to attack by air and were able to reinforce their position at the Maleme airfield by capturing the nearby village. The New Zealanders focussed their attention on a counter-attack of the airfield planned for the early hours of 22 May.

German plan of attack

The German flotilla had reached the island of Milos on the night of 20 May and so the decision was made that it should put to sea and aim to reach Maleme before dark on 21 May. In addition more ammunition would be flown in for the troops already at Maleme airfield, the remainder of the paratroops would be landed, and, as soon as the airfield was taken, a battalion of 5 Mountain Division would be flown in.

The commanding officer of 100 Mountain Regiment was ordered to embark his Headquarters and II Battalion in troop-carrying planes and be ready to force a landing at Maleme from 4 pm onwards.

Plans were also made for a fresh assault on the airfield, using more paratroops, and 8 Air Corps was ordered to renew their attack on the villages of Maleme and Pirgos and the New Zealand guns covering Maleme airfield. This air attack was to begin at 3 pm and last an hour, then the ground operations would begin.

5 Brigade

At about 3 am the 5 Brigade unit commanders had a conference and as a result resolved to hold their positions rather than to launch an immediate counter-attack to drive the enemy back from the airfield; 22 Battalion would reorganise itself. Brigadier Hargest agreed with this decision.

In the event, the battalions re-organised themselves during the early morning. Most of the fighting during this period consisted of artillery fire and mortar exchanges, including shooting at German planes attempting to land on the airfield.

Then the German attack started: paratroops arrived in the morning and the Assault Regiment attacked and captured Maleme village during the afternoon. More paratroops landed in the area between Platanias and Pirgos and were roughly handled by 19 Army Troops Coy. They also landed in the 28 (Maori) Battalion area where there was fierce fighting as a result. By around 7 o'clock that evening, however, the Germans had been successfully mopped up.

The men in 23 Battalion spent most of the day under pressure from the Germans—mainly from the west—but all the attacks were beaten off.

In the afternoon of 21 May, General Freyberg held a conference with Brigadiers Puttick, Inglis, Vasey and Stewart. They decided that a two-battalion counter-attack would be strong enough, and would take place that night using 20 and 28 Battalions. 2/7 (Australian) Battalion would be redeployed to replace 20 Battalion in the defence screen near Canea.

Puttick returned to his headquarters and sent Lt-Col Gentry to 5 Brigade HQ to pass on the information. He found that a plan had already been devised which made it clear that a successful attack depended on it being carried out at night. The plan was that 20 Battalion on the right side of the coast road would carry the attack as far as the airfield; 28 Battalion on the left would go as far as the Tavronitis River. The starting time would depend on when 20 Battalion arrived at the starting point near the Platanias River—it was thought that this would be around 1 am on 22 May.

The official New Zealand historian of the battle mentions three weaknesses in this plan:

1. There was little understanding that the ground to the west of the aerodrome also needed to be cleared of Germans

2. The timing of the attack depended on the prompt arrival of 20 Battalion

3. There was bound to be strong enemy pockets between Platanias and Maleme which meant there would be fighting and consequently losses and dispersion en route to the hoped for objectives. (D. M. Davin, Crete, Wellington, NZ, 1953, pp. 198–9)

10 Brigade (Galatas/Canea)

In the morning of 21 May the 10 Brigade front was reasonably clear. Pink Hill was now a no-man's land. During the morning, however, the Divisional Cavalry and 19 Battalion came under attack from German forces on Cemetery Hill so D Company of 19 Battalion, with some tank support, counter-attacked around midday and took the hill. The crest was too exposed though, so they could not stay, and withdrew. The attack brought considerable relief to the New Zealanders as the counter-attack got rid of some German mortars and light machine guns. Cemetery Hill, too, became no-man's land after this action, which was the principal activity on the 10 Brigade front that day. The line continued to be mortared and attacked by the Luftwaffe, and more paratroops (3 Parachute Regiment) landed in the area during the day.

4 Brigade

Elsewhere 18 and 20 Battalions spent the day patrolling and mopping up remnants of German troops and the signallers worked to repair communication lines. The main preoccupation of Brigadier Puttick and his Headquarters was the night's counter-attack at Maleme and the threat of invasion by sea.

Retimo & Heraklion

The fighting around the airfields at Retimo and Heraklion was mainly undertaken by Australian and Greek units, with some British stationed near Heraklion. At one stage III Battalion of 1 Parachute Regiment attacked Heraklion and got as far as the harbour before being driven back by English and Greek troops. Both Retimo and Heraklion were more or less cut off from the fighting to the west and one of General Freyberg's worries was how to replenish the units' supplies and ammunition.

Freyberg's main concern, however, was with the situation at Maleme. As a result, he did not press Puttick to attack the German forces in Prison Valley. Freyberg was probably concerned about the threatened sea invasion, and may have thought that if the counter-attack at Maleme was successful then the Germans in Prison Valley could be dealt with.

He also had the responsibility of keeping the King of Greece safe. It was obvious he was going to have to be evacuated, and so he and his entourage were sent overland to the south coast with a platoon from B Company of 18 Battalion as escort—soldiers that Freyberg could ill spare.

Day three, 22 May 1941: counter-attack on Maleme airfield

On 22 May communication and other problems crippled the planned British counter-attack on the Maleme airfield. The German position was consolidated as more troops and supplies were flown in and the Allies were forced to withdraw from Maleme: a new front line was to be formed forward of the village of Platanias.

German plan of attack

German orders for 22 May: 11 Air Corps was to continue landing 5 Mountain Division on Maleme and consolidate their possession of the airfield. Preparations would be made to attack Canea and Suda Bay. 8 Air Corps was to attack the British fleet, especially to the north of Crete, and to patrol the sea between Crete and North Africa. They were also to support 11 Air Corps, especially in the west by attacking gun positions, tanks and centres of resistance, to prevent troop movements on the island and to deny the RAF the use of any of the island's airfields.

5 Brigade

Plans went ahead for the counter-attack at Maleme, but problems arose: while 28 (Maori) Battalion was in position shortly before midnight, there was no sign of 20 Battalion. It turned out that Brigadier Puttick had ordered that 20 Battalion could not move until reinforced by the Australian 2/7 Battalion, who were coming from Georgeoupolis. The reason for Puttick's orders was the information that a German invasion by sea would occur that night.

Unfortunately, although 2/7 Battalion left Georgeoupolis on time, they were bombed heavily en route and in consequence split up. A and B Companies went ahead but the other three companies were held up. In Canea further delays resulted from misdirections and difficulties with passwords. In consequence the two leading companies did not reach 20 Battalion until about 1 am. Major J.T. Burrows, commanding officer of 20 Battalion, had asked for permission to move off before the Australians arrived, but Divisional Headquarters refused because of the possibility of the sea invasion.

Once the two Australian companies arrived, 20 Battalion finally began to move and by around 3:15 am C and D Companies of 20 Battalion had arrived in position. The rest of the battalion was nowhere in sight and the counter-attack needed to go ahead before daylight, so 20 Battalion began with just these two companies. Burrows left instructions for the other companies to follow on behind in a mopping-up role.

Meanwhile Brigadier Hargest was beginning to have doubts that the attack should be carried out at all, but was told by Puttick that it must go ahead. Although Hargest felt that it was too late, it must be remembered that Maleme was now the vital point for the defence of the island and to cancel the attack would have meant that there was nothing to stop the Germans from sending in reinforcements the next day and perhaps breaking through the front.

The counter-attack began at about 3:30 am. The force soon found that their progress would have to consist of a series of actions. Along their whole front 20 Battalion kept meeting pockets of Germans armed with machine guns and for the most part dealt with them by headlong charges because there was no time to organise set attacks. As the battalion got closer to Pirgos (a village near the airfield) this opposition became more intense. Captain Charles Upham of C Company gave the following account:

'Went on meeting resistance in depth—in ditches, behind hedges, in the top and bottom stories of village buildings, fields and gardens on road beside [aero]drome.There were also mines and booby traps which got a few of us. We did not know that they were there.

'There was T.G. [tommy gun] and pistol fire and plenty of grenades and a lot of bayonet work which you don't often get in war. The amount of [machine gun] fire was never equalled. Fortunately a lot of it was high and the tracer bullets enabled us to pick our way up and throw in grenades. We had heavy casualties but the Germans had much heavier. They were unprepared. Some were without trousers, some had no boots on. The Germans were helpless in the dark..'

Dan Davin, Crete, Wellington, NZ, 1953, p. 216

28 (Maori) Battalion at first met less opposition but as they neared Pirgos they, too, found it much heavier.

As day came the three tanks accompanying the infantry got into trouble and eventually had to withdraw. Daylight also saw a renewal of attacks from the air. Meanwhile 20 Battalion's D Company had reached the airfield but had to withdraw about 100 yards as they came under heavy machine gun fire. The other companies were heavily engaged as well, so it was decided not to attempt to carry out the original plan as this would have meant going across the open ground of the airfield in broad daylight. The battalion was to move in behind 28 Battalion and eventually get onto the higher ground overlooking the airfield—if 28 Battalion had not already got there. The message to change the plan did not reach everyone, but most of troops got out and into 23 Battalion area.

Daylight saw 28 Battalion fighting their way through Pirgos but they were unable to get up onto that higher ground because of heavy German machine gun and mortar fire. As company commander Major Dyer from the battalion put it:

'We must get forward and get above and round the Germans whose bullets and mortar bombs were cracking around us. We could at times see German machine gunners running up through the trees. We collected in small groups and worked forward. Men were hit, men were maimed. The din of the fight was incessant. There seemed to be German machine guns behind all the trees. If we could silence one or two immediately in front we might break through.'

Davin, Crete, p. 220

Meanwhile 21 Battalion had pushed ahead through Xamoudhokhori and made good progress. When Colonel Allen, the commanding officer, heard that 20 and 28 Battalions had been held up, he decided to stabilise his battalion's position. By mid-afternoon his forward companies had withdrawn after heavy attack from the Germans. By about 4 o'clock, Allen re-formed the battalion on Vineyard Ridge, from which it had set out that morning.

23 Battalion was the least engaged of the battalions on that front in the early part of the day.

By the afternoon it was clear that no further progress could be made by the counter-attackers. Lt-Col Dittmer (28 Battalion) was keen to push on but when he consulted with the commanders of 22 and 23 Battalions he found that little could be done. Artillery support was thin and the other two commanders felt that the best course was to hold on to what they had regained and stop enemy infiltration of the area.

With the failure of the counter-attack on what Davin so eloquently calls, 'that hard day' (Davin, Crete, p. 226), the initiative passed back to the Germans. They lost no time in pressing forward.

The artillery had done their best to support the counter-attack but were operating under great difficulty—stocks of ammunition were low and they had no communication with the attacking battalions. Some ammunition was sent forward to help with the counter-attack and the artillery were able to keep shooting at the airfield.

It took some time for information on the progress of the counter-attack to trickle back to Hargest. He reported positively to Puttick during the morning, even interpreting the sight of planes landing on the airfield as possibly the Germans evacuating. But it was clear from 20 Battalion reports to Divisional Headquarters that the Germans were landing men and stores. By mid-afternoon, Hargest had a better idea of what was happening after he received a message to the effect that 20 Battalion had withdrawn, 28 Battalion was holding on, and 21 Battalion was still attacking and making progress.

To add to his worries, German parties were coming in from the south and beginning to establish themselves in the hills around Ay Marina, about halfway between Canea and Maleme, where they could potentially cut the road. Hargest asked Divisional Headquarters if 10 Brigade could attack westwards to check this, and this was agreed to.

Canea-Galatas

Forces from Colonel Heidrich's 3 Parachute Regiment, which was still in the prison area, were sent northwards to cut the coast road.

The Composite Battalion spent the day patrolling, while two companies of 19 Battalion were sent off to attack the Turkish fort in Prison Valley. They met such strong resistance, however, that they eventually returned.

In the area around Pink Hill it was a busy day after a quiet morning. Some German troops got to the top of the hill and the situation looked dangerous so reserves were called up to help the Petrol Company. They had moved into position for a counter-attack, when

'a most infernal uproar broke out across the valley. Over an open space in the trees near Galatos came running, bounding and yelling like Red Indians, about a hundred Greeks and villagers including women and children, led by Michael Forrester twenty yards ahead. It was too much for the Germans. They turned and ran without hesitation, and we went back to our original positions.'

Howard Kippenberger, Infantry Brigadier, quoted in Davin, Crete, p. 234

Davin also quotes Driver A. Q. Pope of the 4 RMT Company (Reserve Mechanical Transport):

'Out of the trees came Capt Forrester of the Buffs, clad in shorts, a long yellow army jersey reaching down almost to the bottom of the shorts, brass polished and gleaming, web belt in place and waving his revolver in his right hand. He was tall, thin-faced, fair-haired, with no tin hat—the very opposite of a soldier hero; as if he had just stepped on to the parade ground. He looked like a Wodehouse character. It was a most inspiring sight. Forrester was at the head of a crowd of disorderly Greeks, including women; one Greek had a shot gun with a serrated-edge bread knife tied on like a bayonet, others had ancient weapons—all sorts. Without hesitation this uncouth group, with Forrester right out in front, went over the top of a parapet and headlong at the crest of the hill. The [Germans] fled.'

Davin, Crete, pp. 234–5

The line was thus restored!

Little happened on 4 Brigade front other than patrolling and a move to Galaria in support of 19 Battalion's probe into the Turkish fort area. Neither were there any major developments in the area around Suda Bay.

At Creforce Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters the hours passed anxiously as the commanders waited for news from Maleme. By the middle of the afternoon it had become clear that the attacking battalions had not established themselves on their objectives and Freyberg realised that the Germans were pouring in reinforcements and materiel.

Because of the German air superiority nothing more in the way of a counter-attack could be mounted that day. If there was any hope of success, such an attack would have to be mounted that night, 22/23 May.

Freyberg called a conference at 5 pm and gave his orders for a fresh counter-attack. When Brigadier Puttick returned to Divisional Headquarters, however, he found that the position had altered for the worse. There was considerable movement of German troops on 10 Brigade's front and the road between and 4 and 5 Brigade Headquarters was threatened by German troops. When he reached 4 Brigade Headquarters he learnt that there had been a strong attack against Galatas and movement of other German troops suggested an attempt to cut the road to the east of 5 Brigade. Hargest reported that his troops were exhausted and not fit to make a further attack—this was probably an underestimation of their ability (and eagerness) to fight on.

As a result Puttick decided that 5 Brigade should be withdrawn and telephoned Freyberg to urge that this be done. It was clear to Freyberg that such a move would mean a sacrifice of territory unlikely to be regained. In effect, to withdraw 5 Brigade was to accept the loss of Maleme, but there seemed no other choice. And so the decision was made at Divisional Headquarters—5 Brigade's new front line was to be formed forward of Platanias and its battalions were to be disposed along the main coast road to link up with 10 Brigade's line. 4 Brigade regained 20 Battalion and took over 22 Battalion.

The advantages of this plan were that the line was shortened and the safety of the line of communication was secured. Moreover the German troops in Group West and in Prison Valley would have to make a long detour to the south to join forces. The shortcomings, however, were major: the Germans were now able to build up their forces without any interference and would therefore inevitably become strong enough in time to force a continuation of the withdrawal.

Next page: The Battle: Day 4-6